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INTRODUCTION

In Greek mythology, the character Odysseus faced a dilemma of confronting
either Scylla or Charybdis.' Scylla was a monster with twelve feet and six heads
* J.D. Candidate, University of Wyoming College of Law, Class of 2021. I would like to
thank Assistant Dean Lindsay Hoyt for her incredible feedback and guidance and the Wyoming Law
Review Editorial Board for their thoughtful comments. Most importantly, I would like to thank my
family and friends for their continued support and encouragement throughout the writing process.
1 QBE Ins. v. Jorda Enters., 277 ER.D. 676, 700 n.5 (S.D. Fla. 2012). Courts have
acknowledged that defendants can be placed "between a rock and a hard place." See id. at 686. The
defendant in QBE argued that it was caught "between a rock and a hard place" because the only
witness it could provide to answer a deposition was its insured, an opposing witness in a subrogation
claim. Id. Similarly in Barrera, the defendant was placed "between a rock and a hard place" when
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who lived in a cave, and Charybdis was a monster who drank down the water
2
three times a day causing a dangerous whirlpool. Odysseus had to choose
between either being eaten by Scylla or being pulled into the water and drowned
by Charybdis. 3 Odysseus was stuck "between a rock and a hard place."' In 2016,
Mario Barrera found himself in Odysseus' shoes when he faced two equally
undesirable choices: (1) confess to possession of methamphetamine and face
criminal charges for possession of a controlled substance; or (2) say nothing and
face a felony charge for taking a controlled substance into a jail in violation of
Wyoming Statute Section 6-5-208.5
States are split on whether a court can convict an arrestee with taking,
passing, or introducing controlled substances into a jail when the arrestee enters
the jail involuntarily.6 The majority of jurisdictions allow a court to convict these
arrestees. 7 In Barrera v. State, the Wyoming Supreme Court addressed this issue
and decided to follow the majority of jurisdictions.' As a result, the Court upheld
Barrera's conviction for taking controlled substances into the jail by deciding
that Wyoming Statute Section 6-5-208 applied to arrestees who took controlled
substances into the booking area of the jail while officers booked the arrestees
for another crime.9 Additionally, the Court found that the State did not violate
Barrera's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination."o

he faced two undesirable options. See Barrera v. State, 2017 WY 123, 1 27, 403 P3d, 1025, 1031
(Wyo. 2017).
2 QBEIns., 277 ER.D. at 700
n.5.
3 See Dearmore v. City of Garland, 400 E Supp. 2d 894, 906 n.7 (N.D. Tex. 2005). The
court discussed that the city ordinance did not violate the landowner's Fourth Amendment rights
because it failed to place the landowner "between Scylla and Charybdis." Id. at 903-04.

See id. at n.7 (explaining that when mariners traversed the Strait of Messina they faced
two undesirable alternatives of either being eaten by Scylla or drowned by Charybdis which placed
them between a rock and a hard place). The phrase "between a rock and a hard place" is equivalent
to the literary trope "between Scylla and Charybdis." See BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER's DiCTiONARY
OF LEGAL USAGE 800 (3d ed. 2011). When a person is placed "between Scylla and Charybdis" that
person is placed "[i] n a grave dilemma; facing danger on either side." Between Scylla and Charybdis,
BALLENTINE'S IAw DIcnONARY 133 (3d ed. 1969).
' See Barrera, 2017 WY at 1 33, 403 P.3d at 1031 (Kautz, J., dissenting). In Wyoming, it is a
crime for any person to take controlled substances into the jail. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-5-208 (2019).
6 Compare State v. Alvarado, 200 P.3d 1037 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Winsor, 110
S.W3d 882 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Barnes, 747 S.E.2d 912 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013); State v.

Cargile, 123 Ohio St. 3d 343, 2009-Ohio-4939, 916 N.E. 2d 775 (Ohio 2009), with State v. Cole,
164 P3d 1024 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Tippetts, 43 P3d 455 (Or. Ct. App. 2002); State v.

Eaton, 177 P3d 157 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
7 See Barrera,2017 WY at 5 14, 403 P3d at 1028-29 (majority opinion); Alvarado, 200 P.3d
at 1040-41 (explaining that courts are split on this issue).

' See Barrera,2017 WY at 12, 403 P3d at 1027.

9 See id. at 129, 403 P3d at 1031.
o

Id
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This Case Note posits that, in Barrera, the Wyoming Supreme Court's
holding was incorrect because the Court inaccurately interpreted a voluntary
act." In doing so, the Court overemphasized the law enforcement officers'
warnings and failed to recognize the important factual differences between the
previous decisions interpreting Wyoming Statute Section 6-5-208 and Barrera.'2
The Court also overlooked Wyoming's strong tradition of jealously guarding an
individual's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.1 3 The holding in
Barrera unfairly places certain arrestees between a rock and a hard place." In
order to eliminate this undesirable situation and preserve the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination, the Court should have adopted the minority
position.'I Under the minority position, Wyoming Statute Section 6-5-208 does
not apply to arrestees who take controlled substances into the jail unless the Court
enforces the statute on a case-by-case basis.' 6
This Case Note focuses on the act of taking controlled substances into a jail
and its connection to the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 7
First, it discusses the relevant case law on taking controlled substances into
the jail." Second, it describes the facts of Barrera v. State, and summarizes the
majority and dissenting opinions.'I Third, it argues that the Wyoming Supreme
Court incorrectly held that the statute applied to arrestees who took controlled
substances into the booking area of the jail. 20 Finally, it proposes that the Court
should have adopted the minority position. 2 1

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Voluntary Act Requirement of Taking ControlledSubstances into the jail
1. Minority Position

The minority of jurisdictions do not convict a defendant of taking controlled
substances into the jail because a voluntary act requires something more than

" See infra notes 255-73 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 274-13 and accompanying
text.
1

14

See infra notes 318-37 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 324-28 and accompanying text.

" See infra notes 338-49 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 341-44 and accompanying
text.
17 See infra notes 247-37 and accompanying
text.
"

See infra notes 22-172 and accompanying text.

I

See infra notes 173-46 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 247-37 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 339-49 and accompanying text.

20

21
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22
mere awareness. The minority jurisdictions reason that a state cannot convict
a defendant of taking controlled substances into the jail based merely on the
fact that the defendant voluntarily possessed the controlled substance before an
arrest. 23 Three jurisdictions have adopted the minority position: Oregon, New

Mexico and Washington.

24

The Court of Appeals of Oregon adopted the minority position in State v.
Tippetts.2 5 In Tippetts, the police executed a search warrant on defendant Farell
26
Tippetts' home and ultimately found methamphetamine and a firearm. Officers
27
then arrested Tippetts and transported him to the local jail. At the jail, an officer
28
asked Tippetts whether he had any drugs on his person. Although Tippetts'
exact response was unclear, the officers later charged Tippetts with supplying
29
contraband into a jail after finding a small amount of marijuana in his pocket.
Tippetts contended that he did not voluntarily take the contraband into the jail
because, after his arrest, he could not avoid taking the drugs that were already
3
on his person with him. ' Despite Tippetts' arguments, a jury convicted him,
explaining that he could have admitted to the possession of marijuana before the
3
officer found it. 1
On appeal, Tippetts again argued that he did not voluntarily introduce
32
marijuana into the jail. The Oregon appellate court began its analysis by
interpreting the Oregon statute regarding the minimum requirement for criminal
liability, which holds that a defendant's conduct must include a voluntary act
or omission. 33 Because the defendant's conduct must include a voluntary act,
the Oregon appellate court considered the statutory definition of a "voluntary
act." 34 Oregon law defines a voluntary act as "a bodily movement performed

22

See, e.g., State v. Cole, 164 P.3d 1024, 1027 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Tippetts, 43

P3d 455, 458 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
23

See Tippetts, 43 P.3d at 459; Cole, 164 P.3d at 1027.

24

See Tippetts, 43 P.3d at 459-60; Cole, 164 P3d at 1027; State v. Eaton, 177 P3d 157, 162

(Wash. Ct. App. 2008).
25

See Tippetts, 43 P3d at 459.

26

Id. at 456.

27

Id

Id. The opinion does not mention whether Tippetts answered the officer's question about
possession or if he remained silent. See id. at 456-60.
29 Id. at 456.
28

30

Id.

Id. The statute for supplying contraband states, "A person commits the crime of supplying
contraband if [t] he person knowingly introduces any contraband into a correctional facility ..
OR. REv. STAT. § 162.185 (1)(a) (2019).
.

31

32

Tippers, 43 P.3d at 456.

§

3

Id. at 457; OR. REv.

3

See Tippetts, 43 P3d at 457.

STAT.

161.095 (1) (2019).
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consciously." 3 5 However, the Oregon appellate court expanded the definition of
a voluntary act to include two additional elements: (1) the defendant must have
been more than merely aware of his act; and (2) the defendant must have been
afforded the opportunity to choose whether to commit the act.3 6 The Oregon
appellate court analyzed the commentary to the Model Penal Code in order to
conclude that it could not consider the fact that the defendant voluntarily had
drugs in his possession before his arrest.3 7 Thus, the prior act of drug possession
was insufficient in Oregon to support a conviction of taking controlled substances
into the jail.3 1
In Oregon, courts will convict a defendant of an involuntary act when it is
a "reasonably foreseeable or likely consequence of the voluntary act on which
the State seeks to base criminal liability."3 9 The Oregon appellate court explained
that, based on the facts of Tippetts' case, no juror could conclude that bringing
drugs into the jail was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of drug possession.40
The Oregon appellate court further stated that Tippetts' arrest and transportation
to the jail served as an intervening cause." As a result, the Oregon appellate court
reversed Tippetts' conviction for supplying contraband into the jail.42
The Court of Appeals of New Mexico also adopted the minority position
in State v. Cole.4 3 In Cole, police arrested and charged Patrick Cole with driving
under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs. 4 At the jail, Cole filled out
a questionnaire and marked that he did not have any drugs in his possession.
An officer then searched Cole and found a bag of marijuana in his pocket.4 6 As a
result, the State charged Cole with bringing contraband into the jail in violation
of New Mexico law.4 7 The district court dismissed the charge with prejudice

35 Id. (quoting OR. REv. STAT. § 161.085(2)). Surprisingly, Oregon, a minority jurisdiction,
had a similar statutory definition for a voluntary act as Arizona, a majority jurisdiction. See Auz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-105(10) (2019); see also infra note 80 and accompanying text.
6 See Tippetts, 43 P.3d at 458.

3 See id. at 459.
38 Id.
39
40
41
42

Id. at 459-60.
Id. at 460.
Id
Id.

43 See State v. Cole, 164 P.3d 1024, 1027 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007).
" Id. at 1025.
45
46

Id.
Id.

7

Id. The New Mexico statute states, "[b]ringing contraband into a jail consists of knowingly
and voluntarily carrying contraband into the confines of a county or municipal jail .....
N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-22-14(B) (2019).
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because Cole was involuntarily present in the jail and had to make the decision of
48
whether to remain silent or confess to the possession of marijuana.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico thoroughly discussed the
4
Tippetts decision and agreed with its reasoning." The appellate court specifically
agreed with how the Oregon court distinguished Tippetts' voluntary act of
possession before his arrest from his involuntary act of introducing a controlled
0
substance into the jail. Tippetts chose to commit the offense of possession but he
did not choose to commit the offense of introducing a controlled substance into
a jail.5' The appellate court expanded on this reasoning when it stated that Cole
did not voluntarily bring the contraband into the jail because law enforcement
52
brought him and the contraband into the jail. Ultimately, the appellate court
held that a defendant must enter the jail voluntarily or a court cannot convict the
53
defendant of bringing contraband into the jail.
Comparably, the Court of Appeals of Washington also adopted the minority
54
position in State v. Eaton. In Eaton, police arrested Thomas Eaton, transported
5
him to the local jail, and searched him. During the search, the officer found
6
5
methamphetamine inside a plastic bag. As a result, the State charged Eaton with
7
possession of a controlled substance. Because Eaton possessed the controlled
substance inside the jail, the trial court gave Eaton a sentence enhancement." He
59
appealed the trial court's imposition of the sentence enhancement.
On appeal, Eaton argued that he did not voluntarily take the controlled
substance into the jail." Specifically, he argued that upon his arrest, he "no
longer had control over his location or over any of his possessions [because the]
6
control rested with the arresting officer." ' Eaton relied on the Tippetts decision in

" See Cole, 164 P.3d at 1027.
' See id. at 1026-27.

o See id. at 1027; see also State v.Tippetts, 43 P3d 455, 457 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
" See Cole, 164 P.3d at 1027; Tippetts, 43 P.3d at 458.
52 See Cole, 164 P3d at 1027.
53

Id.

54 See State v. Eaton, 177 P3d 157, 162 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).

51 Id. at 158.
56 Id.
57

Id.

5'

Id. The sentence enhancement statute states, "[a]dditional times shall be added to the

standard sentence range if the offender or an accomplice committed the offense while in a county
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.533(5) (2019).
jail or state correctional facility .....
9

See Eaton, 177 P3d at 159.
id.

60 See
"

Id. at 160 (quoting Br. of Appellant at 8).
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order to support his argument that a court could not hold him criminally liable
for his involuntary act.6 2 The Court of Appeals of Washington found the Tippetts
decision persuasive.13 As a result, the court reasoned that Eaton voluntarily
possessed the controlled substance, but he did not voluntarily take the controlled
substance into the jail because the officer did." Because the legislature did
not intend to punish a defendant like Eaton for his involuntary act of taking
controlled substances into the jail, the Court of Appeals of Washington vacated
Eaton's sentence enhancement."
2. Majority Position
The majority of jurisdictions find defendants guilty of taking a controlled
substance into jail even if they were involuntarily present in the jail.66 Arizona
adopted the majority position in State v. Alvarado. During a pat down, police
found 71 milligrams of marijuana and a marijuana pipe on Ivan Alvarado's
person.6 ' They then arrested Alvarado and transported him to the local jail. 9
Before entering the jail, an officer asked Alvarado twice if he had any other drugs
on him and explained that Alvarado would face additional charges if he took drugs
into the jail. 70 Both times Alvarado responded "[n]o" and the officer brought
him into the jail.7' Once inside, the officer searched Alvarado and found 790
milligrams of marijuana. 72 The State charged Alvarado with promoting prison
contraband pursuant to Arizona law.73

62

See id. at 161.

63 See

id.

* Id.
61 Id. at 162.
66 See, e.g., State v. Alvarado, 200 P3d 1037, 1038
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Winsor,
110 S.W3d 882, 886 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Barnes, 747 S.E.2d 912, 919 (N.C. Ct. App.

2013); State v. Cargile, 123 Ohio St. 3d 343, 345, 2009-Ohio-4939, 1 13, 916 N.E. 2d 775, 777
(Ohio 2009).
67 See Alvarado, 200 P3d
at 1038.
68

Id.

69

Id.

70

See id.

7i See id.
72

Id at 1039.

7
Id. at 1038. The Arizona statute for promoting prison contraband states, "[a] person,
not otherwise authorized by law, commits promoting prison contraband [b]y knowingly taking
contraband into a correctional facility or the grounds of a correctional facility." ARiz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 13-2505(A)(1) (2019). The Arizona statute is slightly different from the Wyoming statute
at issue in Barrera because the Arizona statute contains the word "knowingly" while the Wyoming
statute does not. Compare Aluz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2505(A)(1) (2019), with Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 6-5-208 (2019).
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At trial, Alvarado filed a motion for judgment of acquittal on the ground
74
that the State failed to prove that he took contraband into the jail voluntarily.
The trial judge denied the motion, and the jury subsequently convicted him of
promoting prison contraband.75 Following his conviction, Alvarado renewed his
7
motion for judgment of acquittal. 7 6 In that motion, Alvarado relied on Tippetm. n
The Alvarado trial judge granted the renewed motion because "the facts and the
law recited and relied upon in Tippetts are virtually identical to the facts and law
in this case." 78
79
The Arizona
The Court of Appeals of Arizona declined to follow Tippet.
defined a
Legislature
Arizona
the
because
Tippetts
rejected
court
appellate
of effort
a
result
as
and
consciously
voluntary act as a "bodily movement performed
and determination.""s In order to further clarify what constituted a voluntary act,
the Arizona appellate court turned to the Arizona Supreme Court for guidance."
The Arizona Supreme Court explained that the voluntary act requirement is
82
"a codification of the common law requirement of actus reus[.]" The Arizona
Supreme Court further explained that the requirement of a voluntary act does
83
not modify the mens rea of the offense. The Arizona appellate court applied
these principles to Alvarado's case by noting that Alvarado confused the voluntary
84
act requirement with the mens rea of knowingly. Alvarado became confused
when he argued that the State had to prove that he knew he was taking marijuana
into the jail and that he entered the jail voluntarily." The Arizona appellate
court corrected Alvarado's confusion by clarifying that the prison contraband
statute does not require an individual to enter the jail voluntarily in order to
86
face conviction.

The Arizona appellate court further distinguished Tippetts by explaining
that Alvarado had an opportunity to surrender the contraband when the
7

SeeAlvarado, 200 P.3d at 1039.

7 Id. Alvarado was also convicted of possession of marijuana and possession of drug
paraphernalia. Id.
76

Id.

7

Id. (citing State v. Tippetts, 43 P.3d 455, 459 (Or. Ct. App. 2002)).

78

Id.

7

See id. at 1041.

so Id. (quoting Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-105(37) (2001)).
81 Id
82

Id. (emphasis omitted).

Id. Mens rea describes a defendant's culpable mental state. State v. Lara, 902 P.2d 1337,
1339 (Ariz. 1995). Culpable mental states include when a defendant acted intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly, or with criminal negligence. Aluz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-105(10) (2019).
84 See Alvarado, 200 P.3d at 1042.
83

86

Id
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officer informed him of the consequences of bringing contraband into the jail.1 7
Instead of telling the officers about the marijuana, Alvarado chose to carry it
into the jail." According to the Arizona appellate court, Alvarado's choice to
ignore the officer's warnings and carry the contraband into the jail constituted a
voluntary act. 9 The Arizona appellate court considered this act as evidence that
Alvarado voluntarily took the contraband into the jail in violation of the prison
contraband statute.90 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals of Arizona reversed the
trial court's decision.91
Unlike the Arizona appellate court, the Ohio appellate courts disagreed on
whether to adopt the majority or minority position. 92 In State v. Cony, officers
allowed the defendant to go back into his house to change his clothes before they
arrested him.93 Once the officers arrested Conley and took him to the jail, they
asked him whether he had any contraband in his possession." Conley responded
that he did not possess any contraband, but the officers' subsequent search
revealed that he was carrying illegal drugs.95 In State v. Sowry, a different Ohio
court was faced with a similar basic fact pattern: police arrested Sowry, took him
to jail, and Sowry stated that he did not possess any drugs, although officers later
found marijuana in his pants.9 6 Despite these factual similarities, the Ohio Second
District Court of Appeals reversed Sowry's conviction for knowingly conveying
a drug into a detention facility while the Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals
affirmed Conley's conviction for the same crime.9 7
In both Conley and Sowry, the defendants lied about possessing contraband
before entering the jail; however, significant factual differences also could have
contributed to the courts' disparate results.98 First, Conley had an opportunity to
rid himself of the drugs before entering the jail because, when Conley reentered
his house to change his clothes, he could have disposed of the drugs before the

87

Id

88 Id
89 Id.

90 Id.
" Id. at 1043.
Michael Rogers, Drugs in a Detention Facility:State v. Cargile, 36 OHIo N.U.L. REv.
1145,

92

1148-49 (2010).
9
State v. Conley, No. 05 CA 60, 2006 WL 136131, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).
9
Conley, 2006 WL 136131, at *2; see Rogers, supra note 92, at 1148.
Conley, 2006 WL 136131, at *2; see Rogers, supra note 92, at 1148.
96 Rogers, supra note 92, at 1148-49; State v. Sowry, 155 Ohio App. 3d 742, 743, 2004Ohio-399, 5 1-3, 803 N.E. 2d 867, 868 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
97 Rogers, supra note 92, at 1149; see Sowry, 155 Ohio App. 3d
at 743, 2004-Ohio-399,
1 1-2, 803 N.E. 2d at 870-71; Conley, 2006 WL 136131, at *2.
9

98 See Rogers, supra note 92, at 1149.
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officers arrested him."9 In contrast, Sowry did not have a single opportunity to
dispose of the drugs before entering the jail because police arrested Sowry and took
00
Second, the officers in Conley advised the defendant
him straight into the jail.o
twice that he could face a felony conviction if he brought drugs into the jail.'o
Alternatively, the officers in Sowry never advised the defendant of the potential
02
consequences of bringing controlled substances into the jail.' Because of these
factual differences, the Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals adopted the majority
position in Conley while the Ohio Second District Court of Appeals adopted the
3
minority position in Sowry.'o
Additionally, the two Ohio appellate courts reached different outcomes based
on how they viewed a voluntary act. 10 4 The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals
determined that a reasonable jury could find that Conley acted voluntarily
while the Ohio Second District Court of Appeals held that Sowry did not act
voluntarily.0 5 The Ohio Second District Court of Appeals found Sowry did not
act voluntarily because the officers deprived Sowry of his ability to control his own
1 6
person when the officers brought him and the drugs into the jail. o The Ohio
Second District Court of Appeals concluded that because Sowry did not exercise
control over his own body, he was incapable of voluntarily bringing controlled
07
substances into the jail.
Ultimately, in 2009, the Ohio Supreme Court ended the controversy between
5
the appellate courts and adopted the majority position in State v. Cargile.'"
In Cargile, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's conviction for
knowingly conveying a drug of abuse into a jail because he had ample opportunity to dispose of the drugs before he entered the jail.o' Cargile could have

99 See Conley, 2006

WL 136131, at *2.

0 Sowry, 155 Ohio App. 3d at 743, 2004-Ohio-399, 1 2-3, 803 N.E. 2d at 868; Rogers,
supra note 92, at 1149.
101

Conley, 2006 WL 136131, at *2; Rogers, supra note 92, at 1149.

1o2 Rogers, supra note 92, at 1149; Sowry, 155 Ohio App. 3d at 743, 2004-Ohio-399, ¶ 2-3,
803 N.E. 2d at 868.
103 See Rogers, supra note 92, at 1148; Conley, 2006 WL 136131, at *2; see also Sowry, 155
Ohio App. 3d at 743, 2004-Ohio-399, ¶ 1-2, 803 N.E. 2d at 870.
10

See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.

M0Rogers, supra note 92, at 1148-49; Conley, 2006 WL 136131, at *2; Sowry, 155 Ohio App.

3d at 745, 2004-Ohio-399, 1 18, 803 N.E. 2d at 870.
'0' See Sowry, 155 Ohio App. 3d at 745, 2004-Ohio-399, 1 18-19, 803 N.E. 2d at 870.
1'7 See id.

' See State v. Cargile, 123 Ohio St. 3d 343, 346, 2009-Ohio-4939, ¶ 20, 916 N.E. 2d 775,
778 (Ohio 2009); see also Rogers, supra note 92, at 1148.
109 See Rogers, supra note 92, at 1146-47; Cargile, 123 Ohio St. 3d at 345, 2009-Ohio-4939,

¶ 13-14, 916 N.E. 2d at 777.
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surrendered the drugs on two separate occasions.no First, Cargile could have
revealed his drug possession when the officers strip-searched him and found
nothing.' Second, Cargile could have informed the officers about the drugs
when they warned him of the potential consequences of bringing the drugs into
the jail.1 12 Because Cargile failed to surrender the drugs before entering the jail,
the Court found that he voluntarily brought the drugs into the jail."' As a result,
the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed his conviction of conveying a drug of abuse
into a jail and officially adopted the majority position."'

3.

Differences Between Majority andMinority Positions

Several differences exist between the majority and minority positions." 5
First, the majority and minority positions vary in how they view the voluntary act
requirement."' Second, the majority position emphasizes a defendant's ability to
dispose of drugs after an officer gives the defendant adequate warnings.' 1 7 Finally,
the majority position relies on the defendant's earlier voluntary act of possession
while the minority position focuses on the act of taking controlled substances into
the jail."'
The first difference between the majority and minority position of taking
controlled substances into the jail is how the courts view the voluntary act
requirement."' The majority position aligns its reasoning with the single
voluntary act viewpoint.' 20 This view adopts Model Penal Code Section 2.01
which requires only a single, voluntary act.12' Therefore, "if the actus reus for an
offense consists of more than one act, or conduct made up of multiple, simpler
acts . . . then the . . . [voluntary act requirement] is satisfied-even if some

of the acts . . . are involuntary."1

22

In contrast, the minority position adopts a

See Rogers, supra note 92, at 1146-47.

Cargile, 123 Ohio St. 3d at 345, 2009-Ohio-4939, 1 14, 916 N.E. 2d at 777.
112

Id.

113

Id.

" Id. at 343, 2009-Ohio-4939, 1 1, 916 N.E. 2d at 776.
115

See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.

"' See infra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
117 See infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
"' See infra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
119 See Charlie Rosebrough, Comment, The Voluntary Act Requirement in Prison Contraband
Cases, 62 ST. Louis L.J. 739, 741 (2018).
120 See id.
121 MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 2.01; see Ian P. Farrell & Justin E Marceau, Taking Voluntariness

Seriously, 54 B.C. L. Ruv. 1545, 1565 (2013).
122 See Farrell & Marceau, supra note 121, at 1565.
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multiple voluntary acts viewpoint.12 3 To illustrate the difference between the two
24
viewpoints, consider a particular offense that contains two actus rei: A and B.1
Under the single voluntary act view, A is a separate requirement than B, but the
125
actus reus requirement can be met when either A or B is found. Under the
multiple voluntary acts viewpoint, both A and B need to be satisfied; therefore,
the two actus rei are distinct and not interchangeable.1 26
The second difference is that the majority position emphasizes a defendant's
ability to dispose of the drugs after an officer gives the defendant adequate
warnings.1 27 According to the majority position, once an officer warns a defendant
of the potential consequences of taking drugs into the jail, the defendant has the
ability to disclose his drug possession to the officer.1 28 Because the defendant had
this opportunity to dispose of the drugs, he did not have to take them into the
jail.1 2 9 Ultimately, if the defendant consciously made the choice to ignore the
officer's warning, the defendant acted voluntarily.'13 0
The last difference is that the majority position relies on the defendant's
earlier voluntary act of possession.13' For example, the Court of Appeals of North
Carolina stated that the relevant North Carolina statute revolves around the
voluntary possession of the drug and not the act of bringing the drug into the
jail.1 32 Similarly, the Missouri Court of Appeals found that the Missouri statute

123 Id. at 1566-67. An example of the multiple voluntary acts viewpoint is the Court of
Appeals of Alabama decision Martin a State. Martin v. State, 17 So. 2d 427, 427 (Ala. Ct. App.
1944). In Martin, the defendant was voluntarily intoxicated but was involuntarily taken to a public
highway. Id. At first, the State charged the defendant with the offense of being intoxicated on a
public highway. Id. The appellate court held that "the involuntariness of the defendant's appearance
in public precluded his conviction, despite the fact that the defendant also committed a voluntary
act." Farrell & Marceau, supra note 121, at 1567 (analyzing Martin, 17 So. 2d at 427). Essentially,
the Martin court established that a single voluntary act, when the actus reus contains multiple
elements, is insufficient to establish liability. Id.
124 See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying
text.
125 See supra note 122 and accompanying
text.
126 See supra note 123 and accompanying
text.
127 See Barrera v. State, 2017 WY 123, ¶ 14, 403 P3d 1025, 1028-29 (Wyo. 2017); see supra
notes 87-90 and accompanying text; see also State v. Cargile, 123 Ohio St. 3d 343, 345, 2009Ohio-4939, 5 14, 916 N.E. 2d 775, 777 (Ohio 2009).
128 See Barrera, 2017 WY at ¶ 14, 403 P3d at 1028-29; see supra notes 87-90 and
accompanying text; see also Cargile, 123 Ohio St. 3d at 345, 2009-Ohio-4939, ¶ 14, 916 N.E. 2d
at 777.
129 See Barrera, 2017 WY at 5 14, 403 P3d at 1029; see also Cargile, 123 Ohio St. 3d at 345,
2009-Ohio-4939, ¶ 13, 916 N.E. 2d at 777.
`
See State v. Alvarado, 200 P3d 1037, 1042 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
131 See State v. Tippetts, 43 P.3d 455, 459 (Or. Ct.
App. 2002).
132 See State v. Barnes, 747 S.E.2d 912, 918 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
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only requires that the defendant voluntarily possess the controlled substance. 1 33
Therefore, in majority jurisdictions, the defendant satisfies the voluntary act
requirement once the defendant knows he possesses a controlled substance and
enters the jail.'m
In contrast, the minority position focuses on the act of taking controlled
substances into the jail, isolating that act from the prior act of possession. 1 35
Minority jurisdictions do not recognize the defendant's voluntary possession of
the drugs before arrest as satisfying the actus reus requirement of the crime. 1 36
Minority jurisdictions treat the voluntary act of possession separately from the
voluntary act of introducing drugs into the jail.1 3 7 Because the two acts are
treated separately, the minority jurisdictions find that defendants are incapable of
voluntarily introducing the drugs into jail because the police took the defendant
and the drugs into the jail.' 38 The minority of jurisdictions conclude that, once
police arrest and transport a defendant into jail, he no longer has the ability to
choose his course of action."3

B. Fifth Amendment Right Against Selfl-ncrimination
The Wyoming Supreme Court has interpreted the Wyoming Constitution
as more protective than the United States Consitution. 40 Prior to the Chavez
v. Martinez decision in 2003, the United States Supreme Court struggled to

133
'm
135

136
137
138
139

See State v. Winsor, 110 S.W3d 882, 887 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
See Alvarado, 200 P.3d at 1041.
See Tipperts, 43 P3d at 457; see also Rosebrough, supra note 119, at 745.

See Tippetts, 43 P.3d at 459.
See Tippetts, 43 P.3d at 457; see also Rosebrough, supra note 119, at 745.
See Tppetts, 43 E3d at 457.
See State v. Eaton, 229 P.3d 704, 708 (Wash. 2010).

140 Walter Eggers III, Note, State ConstitutionalLaw-yomings Interpretation of
its Right
to Silence: Tortolito v. State, 901 P2d 387 (Wyo. 1995) (replacing Tortolito v. State, 855 P2d 864

(Wyo. 1994) (withdrawn)), 31

LAND & WATER

L. REV. 217, 217 (1996). The Fifth Amendment

protects against self-incrimination by stating "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself ..... U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The Wyoming Constitution echoes
this constitutional right and states, "[n]o person shall be compelled to testify against himself in any
criminal case ..... " WY. CONsT. art. 1, § 11. The Framers deliberately placed the self-incrimination
clause in the Fifth Amendment instead of the Sixth Amendment because the Fifth Amendment
contains a range of rights relating to the criminally accused. See Tracey Maclin, Contribution, The
ProphylacticFifth Amendment, 97 B.U.L. REv. 1047, 1062 (2017). While the Sixth Amendment
contains the procedural rights of individuals criminally accused after an indictment, the decision
to place the right against self-incrimination within the Fifth Amendment shows that the Framers
did not intend to restrict the self-incrimination clause to a criminal defendant's trial. Id. (citing
LEONARD W LEvy, ORIGINS OF THE

FIFTH

AMENDMENT:

THE

RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

427 (2d ed. 1968)).
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define the scope of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination."' As
a result, the circuit courts were split over how to treat legal issues involving the
self-incrimination clause.1 42 For example, the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits
held that Fifth Amendment self-incrimination violations only occur when the
coerced statements are used "during a criminal trial, and not in obtaining an
indictment."'4 3 However, the Second and Seventh Circuits expanded the scope
of the right against self-incrimination to all pretrial proceedings.14 4 In 2003, the
United States Supreme Court then narrowed the scope of the Fifth Amendment
in Chavez.14 In Chavez, the Supreme Court held that defendants can only claim
a Fifth Amendment violation if the defendants were "prosecuted or compelled to
be a witness against themselves in a criminal case."'" Later, in Doyle v. Ohio, the
Supreme Court also held that a defendant's post-arrest silence used against him in
court violates the defendant's due process rights.1 47
The Wyoming Supreme Court followed Doyle until 1978 when it expanded
the right against self-incrimination. 4 ' The Court expanded this right in Clenin v.
State, when it held that the Fifth Amendment right to silence exists at all times and
a prosecutor's comments on a defendant's exercise of that right is automatically
reversible error.' 49 However, in 1982, the Court overruled Clenin in Richter v.
State.'5 0 The Richter court held that the possibility of harmless error exists when
a prosecutor comments on a defendant's pre-arrest silence.'' The new rule did
not last long because, in 1984, the Court reinstated the Clenin rule in Westmark
v. State.152 The Westmark court reinstated the Clenin rule because it noted that
the Richter rule allowed prosecutors to play "Russian roulette" with a defendant's
Fifth Amendment rights. 5 3 The Court further expanded the right to silence in

See Geoffrey B. Fehling, Note, Verdugo, Where'd You Go?- Stoot v. City of Everett and
Evaluating Fifh Amendment Self-Incrimination Civil Liability Violations, 18 GEo. MASON L. REv.
141

481, 494 (2011).
142

See id. at 503.

143

Id. at 511 (quoting Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 924 (9th Cit. 2009)).

" Fehling, supra note 141, at 505 n.191. These pretrial proceedings include probable cause
hearings, bail hearings and arraignments. Id. at 506.
5
146

See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003); Fehling, supra note 141, at 483.
See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 766-67; Fehling, supra note 141, at 483-84.
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 611 (1976); Eggers, supra note 140, at 220.

4

'4

See Clenin v. State, 573 P2d 844, 846 (Wyo. 1978); Eggers supra note 141, at 221.
See Clenin, 573 P2d at 846; Eggers, supra note 140, at 221.

"s See Richter v. State, 642 P2d 1269 (Wyo. 1982).
1
152
1

Eggers, supra note 140, at 221; Richter, 642 P.2d at 1275-76.

See Westmark v. State, 693 P2d 220, 225 (Wyo. 1984).
Westmark, 693 P2d at 221.
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Tortolito v. State by holding that an individual's right to silence does not depend
upon Miranda advice.' 5 4 Ultimately, Tortilito reestablished Wyoming's tradition
of protecting an individual's Fifth Amendment right to silence."'
The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is applicable in cases
involving taking controlled substances into a jail.'5 6 For example, the defendant
in Cargile made a Fifth Amendment argument.15 7 Cargile argued that, after he
was arrested, he possessed a constitutional right to remain silent and that if he
had told the officers he possessed drugs, he would have incriminated himself
because he would have subjected himself to criminal prosecution for possession
of a controlled substance. 5" The Ohio Supreme Court rejected Cargile's argument because he did not remain silent."' Instead, Cargile told the officers that
he did not have any drugs in his possession.' 60 The Court stated that the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination does not apply when an individual
provides false responses to an officer's questions.' 6 ' The Court further reasoned
that the Fifth Amendment does not protect an individual from making a difficult
choice on whether to remain silent.1 62
The Kentucky Supreme Court also addressed the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination in Taylor v. Commonwealth.163 In Taylor, the Kentucky
Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that the State violated his
Fifth Amendment right when he was forced to choose whether to waive his Fifth
Amendment right.'" If Taylor chose to waive his Fifth Amendment right, then
he would have avoided a conviction of promoting contraband because he would

Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 390 (Wyo. 1995); Eggers, supra note 140, at 223.
15
Tortolito, 901 P2d at 390; Eggers, supra note 140, at 223.
156 See, e.g., State v. Alvarado, 200 P.3d 1037, 1042 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008); Taylor v.
Commonwealth, 313 S.W3d 563, 566 (Ky. 2010); State v. Cargile, 123 Ohio St. 3d 343, 345,
154

2009 Ohio-4939, ¶ 15, 916 N.E. 2d 755, 777 (Ohio 2009); see infra notes 157-72 and
accompanying text.
'57 See State v. Cargile, 123 Ohio St. 3d 343, 345, 2009 Ohio-4939,
777 (Ohio 2009).
15

See Cargile, 123 Ohio St. 3d at 345, 2009-Ohio-4939,

¶ 15, 916 N.E. 2d 775,

¶ 15, 916 N.E. 2d at 777; see

Rogers, supra note 92, at 1147.
'5
See Cargile, 123 Ohio St. 3d at 345, 2009 Ohio at 1 16, 916 N.E. 2d at 777; see Rogers,
supra note 92, at 1147.

See Cargile, 123 Ohio St. 3d at 345, 2009-Ohio-4939, 1 16, 916 N.E. 2d at 777.
'6' See Cargile, 123 Ohio St. 3d at 345, 2009-Ohio-4939, 1 16, 916 N.E. 2d at 777-78; see
Rogers, supra note 92, at 1147.
162 Cargile, 123 Ohio St. 3d at 345, 2009-Ohio-4939, ¶ 16, 916 N.E. 2d at 777-78 (citing
State v. Canas, 597 N.W2d 488, 496 (Iowa 1999)).
'63 Taylor v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W3d 563, 566 (Ky. 2010).
'

1('4 Id.
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have confessed to the possession of marijuana.' This confession would have
then resulted in the officers disposing of the marijuana before he entered the
jail and, as a result, he would not have violated the criminal statute prohibiting
drugs in jail.'" However, Taylor chose not to waive his Fifth Amendment right
and, instead, took the controlled substance into the jail.' 6 7 Ultimately, by making
this choice, Taylor gambled with the possibility of facing conviction for a more
serious crime.i1s
Similarly, the defendant in Alvarado raised the Fifth Amendment as a defense
on appeal as well.1 69 The Arizona appellate court found that requiring detainees
to choose between confessing to possession or facing a felony charge does not
result in a violation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. 17o There was no violation of Alvarado's Fifth Amendment right
because the officers advised the defendant of the consequences and the defendant
chose to ignore the officers' warnings. 7' 1 When the defendant made the choice to
take the drugs into jail despite potential consequences, the Court concluded he
was an author of his own fate.1 72
III. PRINCIPAL CASE

A.

FactualBackground

On January 30, 2016, three police officers responded to a report of a bar fight
in Gillette, Wyoming.17 When the officers arrived on scene, they interviewed
several witnesses.' 7 4 The witnesses identified a man and a woman as participants
in the bar fight.' 7 After the interview, the officers surveyed the parking lot and
discovered a pickup truck.1'7 When the two officers approached the truck they
found two men and a woman.' 77 The officers smelled marijuana, noticed a firearm,

165

See id

166

See id

167

Id.

168

169

Id.
See State v. Alvarado, 200 P3d 1037, 1042 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).

170

See id.

171
172

Id.
Id. (quoting State v. Carr, 2008 WL 4368240, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008)).

17

Barrera v. State, 2017 WY 123, 1 3, 403 E3d 1025, 1027 (Wyo. 2017).

174

Id

'

Id.

"' Id. at 1 4, 403 P.3d at 1027.
177 Id
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and asked the individuals to exit the vehicle."1 7 One of the men, later identified as
Mario Barrera, exited the truck and handed the officers two open beer bottles.1 7 9
The officers proceeded to search the truck and arrested Barrera for violating
the City of Gillette's open container ordinance.so An officer briefly frisked
Barrera and discovered cigarette rolling papers.'"' The officer then advised Barrera
twice that he would undergo a more thorough search at the jail and that, if he
took any drugs into the jail, he would face a felony charge. 8 2 Both times Barrera
responded that he had nothing on him.'8 3 En route to the jail, the officer once
again advised Barrera about the potential charges he faced if he brought drugs
into the jail. 1 4 Barrera gave the same response.'"'
After arriving at the jail's secured garage, another officer read Barrera a sign
that was posted on the jail door.' 6 The sign indicated that taking drugs into the
jail would result in a felony charge.18 7 In addition to reading the sign, the officer
asked Barrera whether he had any drugs in his possession. 8 ' Barrera replied "t[n] o"
and the officer led him to the door of the jail's booking area.'"' The second door
displayed an identical warning as the first door." 0 After entering the booking area,
the officer thoroughly searched Barrera and found 1.8 grams of methamphetamine
in the watch pocket of his pants.'' The State charged Barrera with a misdemeanor
for possession of methamphetamine and a felony for taking a controlled substance
into jail.1 92 The District Court of Campbell County ultimately convicted Barrera
of both counts and sentenced him to twenty to thirty-six months of incarceration
and a $3,000 fine.1 93 Barrera timely appealed his felony conviction.'
178

Id.

179

Id.

"'o Id. at 5 5, 403 P3d at 1027. The city of Gillette prohibits individuals from consuming or
carrying open containers of malt beverages inside motor vehicles on any street. GILLETTE, Wyo.,
CODE ch. 3, art. 1, § 3-11(c)(1) (2019), www.gillettewy.gov/home/showdocument?id=48 [https://
perma.cc/5YJS-ZM68].
"' See Barrera,2017 WY at 1 5, 403 P.3d at 1027.
182
183

184
185

See id.
Id

Id.
Id.

187

Id at
Id.

18

5 6, 403 P.3d at 1027.

18

Id.

189

Id.

192

Id. at 6,6 403 P E3d at 1027-28.
Id. at 17, 403 P.3d at 1028.
Id at 518, 11, 403 RM at 1028.

191
192
193
194

Id at 11, 403 P 3d at 1028.
See id
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B. Majority Opinion
1
Barrera raised three issues on appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court.
6
Justice Davis wrote for the majority.1 9 The Court held that, when the officers
arrested Barrera, he voluntarily took controlled substances into the jail in violation
of Wyoming Statute Section 6-5-208.1'9 Additionally, the Court held that there
19 8
was no violation of Barrera's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

1. Arrestees Voluntarily Taking Controlled Substances into the jail
The Wyoming Supreme Court first considered whether an arrestee,
involuntarily present in a jail, can voluntarily take a controlled substance into a
jail.' 9 9 The Court determined that Wyoming Statute Section 6-5-208 is a general
200
intent crime; therefore, the defendant must commit the crime voluntarily.

See id. at ¶ 2, 403 P3d at 1027. On the issue of whether the booking area is part of the jail,
the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the booking area was part of the jail. See id. at ¶ 29, 403
P.3d at 1030, 1031.
196 Id. at 1 1, 403 P3d at 1027.
195

'9 See id. at ¶ 29, 403 P3d at 1027. Wyo. STAT. AM. § 6-5-208 (2019) states, "[e]xcept as
authorized by a person in charge, a person commits a felony .. . if that person takes or passes any
controlled substance or intoxicating liquor into the jail ..... Id.
'

Barrera,2017 WY at 1 29, 403 P.3d at 1027.

'9

See id. at 1 2, 403 P.3d at 1027.

Id. at ¶ 12, 403 P3d at 1028. Every crime has two essential elements: an actus reus and a
mens rea. Seymore v. State, 2007 WY 32, ¶ 12, 152 P3d 401, 405 (Wyo. 2007). The actus reus is
the physical component of the crime while the mens rea is the defendant's state of mind. Id The
Wyoming Supreme Court analyzed Wyoming Statute Section 6-5-208 (2019) by stating that it is a
general intent crime. Barrera,2017 WY 123 at 1 12, 403 P.3d at 1028. In Wyoming, a general intent
crime requires the defendant to act voluntarily. Crozier v. State, 723 P.2d 42, 52 (Wyo. 1986). See
also Eric A. Johnson, The Crime That Wasn't There: Wyomings Elusive Second-Degree Murder Statute,
7 Wvo. L. REv. 1, 34 (2007) [hereinafter The Crime That Wasn't There]. As a result, the Wyoming
Supreme Court has defined the mens rea of a general intent crime in conjunction with the actus reus
voluntariness requirement. See Crozier, 723 P2d at 52. The Court has mixed the mens rea with the
actus reus. See id. In contrast, the majority and minority jurisdictions analyze the crime of taking
controlled substances into the jail by separating the mens rea of "knowingly" from the actus reus
of a voluntary act. See, e.g., State v. Alvarado, 200 P3d 1037, 1042 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008); Taylor v.
Commonwealth, 313 S.W3d 563, 565 (Ky. 2010); State v. Barnes, 747 S.E.2d 912, 918-21 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2013); State v. Cole, 164 P.3d 1024, 1027 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Tippetts, 43 P.3d
455, 459 (Or. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Cargile, 123 Ohio St. 3d 343, 344, 2009-Ohio-4939, ¶ 9,
916 N.E. 2d 775, 777 (Ohio 2009). Both the majority and minority jurisdictions define a voluntary
act as "a bodily movement performed consciously. . . . " Alvarado, 200 P.3d at 1040; Tippetts, 43
P3d at 459. See supra notes 35, 80 and accompanying text. Even though the Wyoming Supreme
Court analyzed Wyoming Statute Section 6-5-208 (2019) under the mens rea of a general intent
crime, the Court still relied on the majority jurisdictions' decisions which made their reasoning
under an actus reus analysis. See Barrera, 2017 WY at 1 14, 16, 403 P3d at 1028-29. Ultimately,
this distinction makes little difference in the Court's analysis in Barrera because under Wyoming
law, a general intent crime means the defendant acted voluntarily. See id. at ¶ 12, 403 P3d at 1028.
2"
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Because this was an issue of first impression, the Court looked to other jurisdictions
for guidance. 2 01
The Wyoming Supreme Court focused its attention on Arizona's treatment
of the issue because it found the Arizona and Wyoming statutes similar. 202 The
Court reasoned that the Arizona court's analysis of the Arizona statute was
analogous to the Wyoming statute because "[t]aking . . . share[s] the common
function of introducing or causing the introduction of a prohibited substance
into a jail . . . ."203 The Court then acknowledged that Arizona rejected the
minority position in Alvarado because the Arizona statute did not require the
defendant's voluntary presence in the jail as an element of the offense. 2 ' Further,
the Court noted that the minority position only makes one of the defendant's
choices significant: whether the defendant chose to be present in the jail.2 05
Instead, the Court found the majority position persuasive because it focused on
the choice the defendant made after the officers warned him of the potential
consequences of taking controlled substances into the jail. 20 6 If the defendant's
conduct was a product of a voluntary choice, then the defendant's presence in
the jail is irrelevant.20 7 Next, the Court turned to the legislative intent behind
Wyoming Statute Section 6-5-208 for support. 208 The Court believed that the
Wyoming Legislature did not intend to exclude arrestees and inmates from the
reach of the statute. 209 Thus reassured, the Court adopted the majority position
and held that an arrestee can voluntarily take controlled substances into the jail. 2 10

2. Fifth Amendment Rights
The Wyoming Supreme Court also addressed Barrera's claim that the
State's closing argument deprived him of his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination.21 Specifically, Barrera argued that the State used his silence
regarding his possession of methamphetamine as proof that he voluntarily entered
the jail with a controlled substance. 212 The Court had previously found that a

201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208

Barrera,2017 WY at ! 12-14, 403 P.3d at 1028-29.
See id. at ¶ 16, 403 P3d at 1029; Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2505(A)(1)
(2019).
Barrera,2017 WY at! 17, 403 P3d at 1029.
Id. at ! 16, 403 P3d at 1029; seeAlvarado, 200 P3d at 1041-42.
Barrera, 2017 WY at! 13, 403 P3d at 1028.
See id. at ! 14, 403 P3d at 1028-29.
See id. at 5 15, 403 P.3d at 1029.
Id. at ! 18, 403 P3d at 1029.

209

Id.

210

See id. at 129, 403 P3d at 1031.
Id. at 125, 403 P3d at 1030.

211
212

Id.
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Fifth Amendment violation exists when the State improperly comments on a
21 3
defendant's exercise of his right to silence. Such an improper comment occurs
when the State uses the defendant's silence to the State's advantage or when the
2 14
State argues that the defendant's silence was an admission of guilt. However, if
the State merely emphasizes the defendant's testimony, highlights omissions in the
defendant's statements, or compares or contrasts the defendant's statements, no
improper comment occurs.

2 15

In Barrera, the Wyoming Supreme Court decided that the State's closing
argument did not qualify as an improper comment on Barrera's exercise of
his right to silence.21 6 The Court found that the State validly built its theory
of guilt on the number of times the officers advised Barrera of the potential
charges of taking controlled substances into the jail, followed by his repeated
verbal denials. 2 17 The State used Barrera's repeated denials to reason that Barrera
"had made a difficult choice between two undesirable options. "218 The Court
eventually concluded that the State did not violate Barrera's Fifth Amendment
2 19
right against self-incrimination.

C Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kautz, joined by Justice Fox, argued that the Wyoming Supreme
Court should adopt the minority position on voluntarily taking controlled
221
First, he reiterated
substances into a jail. 2 2 0 Justice Kautz made three points.
the majority's finding that Wyoming Statute Section 6-5-208 is a general intent
crime. 2 22 Second, he acknowledged Wyoming's strong tradition of protecting
2 23
Finally, Justice Kautz
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
distinguished his interpretation of the legislative intent behind Wyoming Statute
22 4
Section 6-5-208 from the majority's interpretation.

213

Id. at 1 26, 403 P3d at 1030; see also Causey v. State, 2009 WY 111, ¶ 22, 215 P3d 287,

294 (Wyo. 2009).
214 See Barrera, 2017 WY at 126, 403 P.3d at 1030; Causey, 2009 WY 111, at 124, 215 P.3d
at 295.
215

See Barrera, 2017 WY at 126, 403 E3d at 1030; Causey, 2009 WY 111, at ¶ 24, 215 P.3d

at 295.
216

Barrera, 2017 WY at 127, 403 PE3d at 1030-31.

217

Id. at

218
219

5

5, 403 P3d at 1030-31.

Id. at 127, 403 P3d at 1031.
Id. at ¶ 28, 403 P.3d at 1031.

221

Id. at 130, 403 P3d at 1031 (Kautz, J., dissenting).
See infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.

222

Barrera, 2017 WY at 131, 403 P3d at 1031 (Kautz,

223

Id. at 135, 403 P3d at 1032 (Kautz,

224

See id. at 139, 403 P3d at 1032 (Kautz,

220
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Justice Kautz began his dissent by explaining that Wyoming Statute Section
6-5-208 is a general intent crime. 2 2 5 He noted that in general intent crimes, the
State is required to prove that the defendant committed the crime voluntarily. 22 6
Specifically, the State needed to prove that Barrera intended to take controlled
substances into the jail. 2 2 7 Justice Kautz reasoned that the evidence only showed
Barrera intended to possess the methamphetamine, but it did not show that he
intended to take it into the jail.2 28 Instead, the evidence indicated only that either
Barrera was not aware of his possession of the drugs or Barrera wanted to avoid
self-incrimination.229
Justice Kautz's dissent illustrates the dilemma Barrera faced when the officers
required him to either confess to possession of a controlled substance or face a
felony charge for transporting drugs into a jail.2 30 This dilemma was worsened
because Barrera was not given a third option of remaining silent. 23 1 Justice Kautz
described the situation as the officers threatening Barrera "with a more substantial
crime-a felony-if he did not confess to possession." 23 2 Justice Kautz identified
the potential problem with the majority's opinion: it created a win-win situation
for the officers because the individual either confesses to possession of a controlled
substance, which may result in a felony, or he faces a different felony charge for
taking a controlled substance into the jail. 233
Justice Kautz also discussed the importance of the Fifth Amendment. 234 He
noted that both the United States Constitution and the Wyoming Constitution
protect an individual's right against self-incrimination.235 He disagreed with the
State's position that it is acceptable for officers to require defendants to choose
between confessing to possession of a controlled substance or facing a felony
charge.2 36 Justice Kautz disagreed because he believed Barrera did not have any
other valid options but to possess the drugs when the police took him into
the jail.2 37 Justice Kautz opined that, even if the officers gave Barrera a chance

225
226
227
228

Id

at

5

31, 403 P.3d at 1031 (Kautz, J., dissenting).
Id. (Kautz, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1 32, 403 P3d at 1031 (Kautz, J., dissenting).
Id. (Kautz, J., dissenting).

5

229

Id. at

230

Id. (Kautz, J., dissenting).

5

33, 403 E3d at 1031 (Kautz,

J.,

dissenting).

231

Id. at

232

Id. (Kautz, J., dissenting).

233

See id. at 5 38, 403 P3d at 1032 (Kautz, J., dissenting).
Id. at 5 35, 403 P3d at 1032 (Kautz, J., dissenting).

234
235
236
237

34, 403 P3d at 1031 (Kautz, J., dissenting).

See id. (Kautz,

J., dissenting).
Id. at 5 37, 403 E3d at 1032 (Kautz,
Id. (Kautz, J., dissenting).

J.,

dissenting).
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to confess to his possession when they questioned him, he still did not have a
2 38
valid option beyond possessing the drugs. He further explained that making
defendants choose between confessing to possession or facing a felony charge
interferes with their Fifth Amendment rights and also incentivizes officers to
2 39
incarcerate individuals who are arrested for minor crimes.
24 0
Finally, Justice Kautz analyzed the legislative intent behind the statute.
to keep controlled
Justice Kautz contended that the State Legislature intended
24 1
Kautz did not
Justice
use.
inmate
prevent
to
order
in
jails
of
substances out
because the
intent
legislative
the
believe that Barrera's conviction supported
officers discovered the drugs during a strip search before Barrera had the ability to
2 42
actually bring the drugs into the jail. The law enforcement procedures at the jail
ultimately led to discovery of the drugs before the drugs entered the jail, so Barrera
2 43
never possessed the drugs as an inmate. justice Kautz recognized the possibility
that an arrestee could voluntarily take controlled substances into the jail, and
2
thus, could be charged under this statute. ' However, Justice Kautz concluded
that, because Barrera did not voluntarily take any controlled substances into the
2 45
jail, the district court should not have convicted him.

IV.

ANALYSIS

In Barrera, the Wyoming Supreme Court incorrectly held that arrestees who
are involuntarily present in a jail can voluntarily take controlled substances into
the jail. 246 The Court's analysis of voluntarily taking controlled substances into a
2 47
First, the Court declined to distinguish
jail was incorrect for several reasons.
between the voluntary act of possession and the voluntary act of taking controlled
8
substances into the jail. 24 Second, the Court overemphasized the law enforcement

238
239
240
241
242

See id. (Kautz, J., dissenting).
Id. at ¶ 38, 403 P3d at 1032 (Kautz, J., dissenting).
See id. at ¶ 39, 403 P3d at 1032 (Kautz, J., dissenting).
See id. (Kautz, J., dissenting).
Id. (Kautz, J., dissenting).

243 See id. (Kautz,

J.,

dissenting).

Id. at ¶ 40, 403 P.3d at 1032-33 (Kautz, J., dissenting) ("Perhaps someone might know
they are going to be arrested, and conceal controlled substances in a manner indicating they hoped
to somehow get them into the jail. Such circumstances could support a conclusion that the actor
chose, or was acting voluntarily, in taking the controlled substances into a jail. Those are not the
facts of Mr. Barrera's case.").
24

245

See id. at 1 41, 403 P.3d at 1033 (Kautz,

J.,

dissenting).

246 See infra notes 248-36 and accompanying text.
247 See infra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
248

See Barrera, 2017 WY at 1 13-15, 403 P.3d at 1028-29; see also infra notes 259-72 and

accompanying text.
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officers' warnings. 249 Finally, the Court failed to recognize the important factual
differences between its previous decisions interpreting Wyoming Statute Section
6-5-208 and Barrera. 250 Additionally, the Court's analysis of the Fifth Amendment
issue was incorrect because the Court overlooked Wyoming's strong tradition of
guarding the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 2 51 As a result, the
Court turned the illusion of a choice into an impossible situation for arrestees:
either self-incriminate or face a felony charge. 252 Instead, the Court should have
resolved this impossibility by adopting the minority position to avoid placing
arrestees between a rock and a hard place. 25 3

A.

The Court'sAnalysis of Voluntarily Taking Controlled Substances into the
jail was Incorrect

The Wyoming Supreme Court's analysis on arrestees voluntarily taking
controlled substances into the jail was incorrect. 25 4 First, the Court declined to
distinguish between voluntary possession of controlled substances and voluntarily
taking controlled substances into the jail. 255 Second, the Court relied too heavily
on the officers' warnings to infer that Barrera acted voluntarily. 25 6 Finally, the
Court failed to recognize the important factual differences between the previous
cases interpreting Wyoming Statute Section 6-5-208 and the facts of Barrera.25 7
The Wyoming Supreme Court declined to distinguish between voluntary
possession of controlled substances and voluntarily taking controlled substances
into the jail. 258 The Court relied entirely on Alvarado, which led the Court to
disregard this important distinction. 25 9 By requiring the State only to prove that
Alvarado possessed a controlled substance voluntarily, the Arizona Supreme Court
disregarded the involuntary nature of the defendant's presence in the jail. 260 The

249 See Barrera, 2017 WY at 1 16, 403 P3d
at 1029; see also infa notes 274-85 and
accompanying text.
250 See infra notes 287-312 and
accompanying text.
251 See Westmark v. State, 693 P2d 220, 225 (Wyo.
1984) (reinstating the Clenin rule which
holds that the Fifth Amendment right to silence exists at all times); see infa notes 318-36 and
accompanying text.
252 See Barrera, 2017 WY at 5 33, 403 P.3d
at 1031 (Kautz, J., dissenting).
253

See infra notes 338-49 and accompanying text.

254 See infa notes 247-337 and accompanying
text.
255
256

See infa notes 259-73 and accompanying text.
See infa notes 274-86 and accompanying text.

257 See infra notes 287-313 and accompanying
text.
258
259

See infra notes 260-64 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.

260 See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
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Alvarado court sidestepped the issue by inferring that Alvarado's drug possession
was voluntary because he ignored the officer's warnings about taking drugs into
a jail. 2 61 Applying Alvarado, the Wyoming Supreme Court rejected Barrera's
argument that his presence in the jail must be voluntary in order to violate the
statute. 26 2 The Court explained that the existence of the crime is independent of
263
whether a defendant's presence in the jail is voluntary.
Although the Court aligned its reasoning with the Alvarado Court, it should
264
have aligned its reasoning with the multiple voluntary acts view. Under this
viewpoint, Wyoming Statute Section 6-5-208 requires two voluntary acts:
(1) voluntarily possessing the controlled substance; and (2) voluntarily taking the
2 65
controlled substance into the jail. Applying this reasoning, Barrera's voluntary
possession of a controlled substance should not be conflated with the act of
26
voluntarily taking a controlled substance into the jail. 6 Although the Court
correctly found that Barrera voluntarily possessed methamphetamine because
he placed it inside the watch pocket in his pants, the Court failed to explain
2 67
how Barrera voluntarily took the controlled substance into the jail. Under the
multiple voluntary acts view, Barrera did not violate Wyoming Statute Section
2 68
6-5-208 because he did not voluntarily take the methamphetamine into the jail.
Additionally, the Wyoming Supreme Court incorrectly inferred that Barrera's
continued possession of the drugs after the officers' warnings was a choice that
he made. 2 69 The Court reasoned that Barrera did not have to take the drugs
with him into the jail because he could have surrendered the drugs to the
officers. 2 70 Further, the Court maintained that, as long as Barrera made a choice
to take the controlled substance into the jail, it qualified as a voluntary act
because "[t]aking .

.

. share[s] the common function of introducing or causing

the introduction of a prohibited substance into a jail . . . ."271 However, a
defendant does not have a voluntary choice when both alternatives result in
2 72
criminal convictions.

261

See supra note 88 and accompanying text.

262

See Barrera v. State,

2017 WY 123, 1 17, 403 P3d 1025, 1028 (Wyo. 2017)

(majority opinion).
263

Id.

264

See supra note 123 and accompanying text.

265

See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.

21 See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
267

See Barrera, 2017 WY at 1 15, 403 P3d at 1029.

268

See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.

269

Barrera,2017 WY at 1 14, 403 P3d at 1028-29.

270

See id.

271

Id. at ¶ 17, 403 P3d at 1029.

272

See id. at 1 34, 403 P3d at 1031 (Kautz,
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The officers' warnings were insignificant as to whether Barrera voluntarily
took controlled substances into the jail because Barrera was not there voluntarily
in the first place. 2 73 The minority jurisdictions do not emphasize the officers'
warnings when analyzing the voluntary act requirement. 2 74 For example, in
the New Mexico case, Cole, the defendant filled out a questionnaire. 2 75 The
questionnaire warned Cole that if he did not inform the officers about his drug
possession and the officers discovered the drugs, then the State would charge him
with a felony.276 The warning in the questionnaire was insignificant because, even
though the police warned Cole about the consequences, the Court of Appeals of
New Mexico still found that Cole did not voluntarily take drugs into the jail.2 77
The warning ultimately placed Cole in an inevitable situation because regardless
of what Cole did, he would face a criminal conviction. 7 ' He did not have a real
chance to get rid of the drugs in a manner where he would avoid a conviction
of either offense. 2 79 In order for Cole to have an actual choice and ultimately act
voluntarily, the officers' warnings would need to occur before he was even arrested
or at least before he entered the jail. 28 0 Instead of focusing on the questionnaire
warning, the Cole court focused on whether Cole entered the jail voluntarily.281 The
court found that Cole did not enter the jail voluntarily because a law enforcement
officer brought him and the contraband into the jail. 28 2 The Wyoming Supreme
Court should have done the same, and focused on the act of voluntarily entering
the jail with a controlled substance instead of reading an officer's warning as an
opportunity to make a choice. 28 3 Wyoming Statute Section 6-5-208 punishes a
defendant who voluntarily takes controlled substances into the jail.28 4 However,
the statute does not punish a defendant for failing to inform officers about
possessing drugs, even when warned of the potential consequences. 28 5
In previous cases, the Wyoming Supreme Court upheld convictions of
inmates who took controlled substances into jail. 28 6 However, these cases are
273
274
275

See infa notes 275-86 and accompanying text.
See infa notes 276-83 and accompanying text.
State v. Cole, 164 P.3d 1024, 1025 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007).

276 See

id

278

See id. at 1027.
See id. at 1025.

279

See id.

280

See id.
See id. at 1027.

277

281

282 See id.
283

See Barrera v. State, 2017 WY 123, 5 14, 403 P3d 1025, 1028-29 (Wyo. 2017)

(majority opinion).
284 See Wyo. STAT. ANN.
285
286

5

6-5-208 (2019).

See id.
Lake v. State, 2013 WY 9,

5

4, 292 P.3d 174,176, 180 (Wyo. 2013); Paramo v. State, 896

E2d 1342, 1343 (Wyo. 1995).
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28 7
The
distinguishable from Barrera due to their important factual differences.
incorrect
the
to
came
thus,
and,
differences
factual
these
Court failed to recognize
288
conclusion in Barrera.

When the Court followed its previous decisions interpreting Wyoming
Statute Section 6-5-208, it failed to recognize the important factual differences
28 9
between those cases when compared with Barrera. In the first case, Lake v. State,
the Crook County Detention Center granted furlough to an inmate defendant to
refill a prescription. 2 90 Lake, the defendant, then returned to the detention center
291
and turned over his prescription bottle to an officer. The next day, officers
searched Lake's jail cell and found eleven Percocet pills that Lake concealed in
his deodorant container. 29 2 The officers discovered that the Percocet pills were
missing from Lake's prescription bottle that he previously turned in upon his
293
Lake knew he would return to jail and he
return from his medical furlough.
2 94
intentionally concealed the pills with intent to bring them into jail. A jury
convicted Lake of violating Wyoming Statute Section 6-5-208.295 In the second
case, Paramo v. State, the defendant was on house arrest and then checked back
into the jail. 2 96 When an officer conducted a strip search, he initially did not
find any contraband on Paramo. 2 97 However, when Paramo turned around, the
officer found a piece of paper that contained tetrahydrocannabinol, a Schedule
2 98
Paramo
I controlled substance, where the defendant had been standing.
voluntarily took the controlled substance into the jail because he knew he would
2 99
return to the jail after one week of house arrest. A jury convicted Paramo of
violating Wyoming Statute Section 6-5-208.1'
Several factual differences distinguish Lake and Paramofrom Barrera.orFirst,
3 02
in Lake and Paramo, both defendants knew they would be returning to the jail.
287 See infra notes 302-13 and accompanying text.
288

See Barrera,2017 WY at 1 40, 403 P3d at 1032 (Kautz, J., dissenting).

289 See infra notes 302-13 and accompanying text.
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297

Lake, 2013 WY at 14, 292 P3d at 176.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1 10, 292 P3d at 177.
Paramo v. State, 896 P2d 1342, 1343 (Wyo. 1995).
Id. at 1344.

298

Id.

299

See id. at 1343.
Id. at 1344.

300

30'

See infra notes 303-12 and accompanying text.

302

Lake v. State, 2013 WY 9, ¶ 4, 292 P.3d 174, 176 (Wyo. 2013); Paramo, 896 P2d at 1343.
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Lake was on furlough to travel for a medical appointment while Paramo spent a
week on house arrest.103 In contrast, Barrera did not know of his impending arrest
that day and did not know he would go to jail. 304 Barrera was simply sitting in a
pickup truck with his friends when officers approached the truck. 305 Second, both
Lake and Paramo made a choice to take the controlled substances into the jail. 306
Lake chose to take the eleven Percocet pills out of his prescription bottle and hide
them in his cell. 30 7 Paramo chose to place the controlled substance somewhere on
his body to conceal it during the strip search.30 In contrast, Barrera simply chose
not to reveal that he had controlled substances to the officers. 309 Finally, both Lake
and Paramo concealed their controlled substances "in a manner indicating that
they hoped to somehow get them into the jail."3 10 Conversely, Barrera's controlled
substance was in a very small baggie in his watch pocket, but this only indicated
a manner of storage and not an act of concealment.3 1"The Court should not have
relied on these previous decisions interpreting Wyoming Statute Section 6-5-208
because of the factual differences between Lake and Paramoand Barrera.312
The Wyoming Supreme Court expressed concern that arrestees would never
face conviction under Wyoming Statute Section 6-5-208 if the Court adopted
the minority position. 31 3 The Court reasoned that the minority position required
a defendant to be present voluntarily in the jail.3 14 The Court worried that no
matter how firm a defendant's intent to take controlled substances into the jail,
he would be immune from the reach of the statute.3 1 However, an arrestee can
still suffer a conviction under Wyoming Statute Section 6-5-208 if he knew of an
imminent arrest and concealed the controlled substance in an attempt to get the
drugs into the jail. 16

303 Lake,

2013 WY at ! 4, 292 P3d at 176; Paramo, 896 P2d at 1343.

3

See Barrera v. State, 2017 WY 123, 1 4, 403 P.3d 1025, 1027 (Wyo. 2017).

305

See id.

306 See Lake, 2013 WY at ¶ 4, 292 P3d at 176; Paramo, 896 P.2d at 1344.
307 See Lake, 2013 WY at ¶ 4, 292
301 See Paramo, 896

P3d at 176.

P.2d at 1344.

3' Barrera,2017 WY at 15, 403 P.3d at 1027.

5

310

Id. at

311

See id. at

40, 403 P.3d at 1032-33 (Kautz,

¶

J., dissenting).

7, 403 E3d at 1028 (majority opinion).

See supra notes 303-12 and accompanying text.
313 See Barrera, 2017 WY at 1 13, 403 P3d at 1028.
312

314

Id.

315 See
316

id.

Id. at 1 40, 403 P.3d at 1032 (Kautz, J., dissenting).
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The Court'sAnalysis of the FifihAmendment was Incorrect

In Barrera, the Wyoming Supreme Court overlooked Wyoming's strong
tradition of guarding the Fifth Amendment. 317 The Fifth Amendment "applies
not only to evidence which an individual reasonably believes could be used
against him in a criminal prosecution but also encompasses evidence that would
3 18
furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute" an individual.
The Court has expanded the scope of the Fifth Amendment by interpreting the
3 19
Wyoming Constitution as more protective than the United States Constitution.
However, in Barrera, the Court overlooked that strong tradition by inaccurately
320
interpreting the voluntary act requirement.
The Court overlooked this long line of Fifth Amendment protection
precedent by reasoning that Barrera had several opportunities to choose to
surrender the drugs but decided to take the controlled substances into the
jail anyway. 32' However, as Justice Kautz suggested, Barrera was not given
322
a real choice of whether to take the controlled substance into the jail. The
officers placed Barrera between a rock and a hard place by requiring him to
either confess to the offense of drug possession or face a felony conviction for
taking methamphetamine into the jail. 32 3 The Court recognized the unfair and
unconstitutional position the officers put Barrera in when it admitted that he had
3 24
to make a "difficult choice between two undesirable options." However, Barrera
was actually in an impossible position 25 because, if Barrera told the officers about
his drug possession before he entered the jail, then he would have incriminated
himself 326 Forcing an individual to implicate himself goes against "[o]ne of the
most fundamental elements of American liberty" which is "protection . . . from
32 7
compulsory confession to crimes.
Even though the officers placed Barrera between a rock and a hard place,
Barrera did not remain silent when the officers advised him of the consequences

317

See infra notes 319-37 and accompanying text.

31
State v. Barnes, 747 S.E.2d 912, 925 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (McGee, J., dissenting) (citing
State v. Pickens, 488 S.E.2d 162, 167 (N.C. 1997)).
319 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
320 See Barrera, 2017 WY at
15, 403 P.3d at 1029.
321 See id. at 5 27, 403 P.3d at 1030-31 (majority opinion).
322 See id. at 1 39, 403 P.3d at 1032 (Kautz, J., dissenting).
323 Id. at 1 33, 403 P3d at 1031 (Kautz, J., dissenting).
324 Id. at 1 27, 403 P3d at 1031 (majority opinion).
325

See id.

See State v. Barnes, 747 S.E.2d 912, 925 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (McGee, J., dissenting)
(explaining that when a defendant confesses to possession of marijuana he incriminates himself).
327 Barrera, 2017 WY at ¶ 35, 403 P.3d at 1032 (Kautz, J., dissenting).
326
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of taking controlled substances into the jail.328 Instead, Barrera denied possessing
methamphetamine several times.3 29 Although the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination does not apply when an individual provides false responses to
an officer's questions,3 30COurts should liberally construe the Fifth Amendment
right. 331 Under a liberal construction, the Fifth Amendment is implicated when
an individual reasonably believes that evidence could be used against him in a
criminal prosecution. 332 An individual in Barrera's shoes reasonably could have
believed that, if he confessed to the possession of methamphetamine, then the
State would use that evidence against him in criminal prosecution. 333 In order to
avoid directly implicating himself, Barrera told the officers that he had "nothing
on him." 334 The Wyoming Supreme Court does not address how upholding
Barrera's conviction under Wyoming Statute Section 6-5-208 implicitly holds
that, in order to avoid a felony conviction under this statute, a defendant must
confess to the crime of drug possession. 335 Ultimately, the Court's analysis on the
Fifth Amendment was incorrect because the Court overlooked Wyoming's strong
tradition of Fifth Amendment protections for defendants.3 3 6

C.

The Wyoming Supreme CourtShould Have Adopted the Minority
Position Regarding Voluntarily Taking ControlledSubstances into the Jail

If the Wyoming Supreme Court adopted the minority position, then an
individual in Barrera's position would not have to make the impossible decision
between confessing to a drug possession offense or facing a felony charge. 337
This result is the essence of the minority position.3 3 8 If the Court adopted the
minority position, it would not render the statute meaningless by immunizing
everyone from its reach. 339 The Court recognized the possibility of situations
where someone went into the jail involuntarily but nevertheless voluntarily took
controlled substances into the jail. 340 For example, an individual might know he

328 Id. at ¶ 5, 403 E3d at 1027 (majority opinion).
329

Id.

3 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
331 See Barnes, 747 S.E. 2d at 925 (McGee,
332

J., dissenting).

Id.

333 See supra note 331-33 and accompanying text.
3

Barrera,2017 WY at

5

5, 403 E3d at 1027.

335 See Barnes, 747 S.E. at 926 (McGee, J., dissenting).
336 See supra notes 318-36 and accompanying text.
337 See State v. Cole, 164 P3d 1024, 1026 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007); see also State v. Tippetts, 43

P3d 455, 458 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
338

See supra notes 22-65 and accompanying text.

3

See Barrera, 2017 WY at 1 13, 403 P.3d at 1028.

3o

See id. at 1 40, 403 P.3d at 1032-33 (Kautz, J., dissenting).
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is going to be arrested and conceal a controlled substance "in a manner indicating
[he] hoped to somehow get [the controlled substance] into the jail.""" This
individual would then have the opportunity to choose whether to commit the act
of taking controlled substances into the jail.34 2 Because those are not the facts in
43
Barrera, the Court would need to make this distinction on a case-by-case basis.3
Additionally, if the Wyoming Supreme Court adopted the minority position,
then a defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination would
remain intact.3"' The Fifth Amendment right would remain intact because the
defendant would not face punishment for a felony based solely on the fact that
he did not confess to the crime of drug possession. 4 5 Additionally, the defendant
need not worry about officers' questions forcing him to confess to drug possession
346
because, under the minority position, the officers' warnings are irrelevant.
The State could only convict a defendant if there were facts to indicate that the
defendant concealed his controlled substance in a way that indicated he hoped
47
to get the controlled substance into the jail without detection. Therefore, the
Court should have adopted the minority position regarding voluntarily taking
controlled substances into the jail.3 48
V.

CONCLUSION

The Wyoming Supreme Court incorrectly held that Wyoming Statute Section
6-5-208 applied to all arrestees who took controlled substances into the booking
area of the jail.34 9 In its reasoning, the Court failed to adequately consider the
minority position.3 5 0 If the Court adopted the minority position, future arrestees
in Barrera's position would never need to choose between confessing to possession
of a controlled substance or facing a felony charge.351 Rather, an arrestee would
only face a felony charge if the arrestee had knowledge of a future arrest and
3 52
concealed the controlled substance in an attempt to get the drugs into the jail.
In addition, the arrestee's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination would

34 Id. (Kautz,

J.,

dissenting).

342 See id. (Kautz, J., dissenting).
33See

id. (Kautz,

J.,

dissenting).

3" See infa notes 346-48 and accompanying text.
3
346

See State v. Barnes, 747 S.E.2d 912, 925 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (McGee,
See supra notes 274-82 and accompanying text.

348

See Barrera, 2017 WY at 1 40, 403 P3d at 1032-33 (Kautz,
See supra notes 338-48 and accompanying text.

349

See supra notes 247-337 and accompanying text.

347

J.,

J.,

dissenting).

dissenting).

o See Barrera,2017 WY at ¶ 16, 403 P.3d at 1029 (majority opinion).
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.

311

352 See supra notes 341-43 and accompanying text.
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remain intact. 353 Instead, the Court implicitly held that in order to avoid facing
a felony conviction, an arrestee must confess to the crime of drug possession.3 54
As a result, this decision ultimately places arrestees into a situation like Odysseus;
between a rock and a hard place. 355

353 See supra notes 345-49 and accompanying text.
3

See supra note 336 and accompanying text.

3

See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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